Pressure to Reach a Compromise

In late July and August of 1977, the number of communications dealing with the Tokai issue increased dramatically and pressure began to build for both the Carter Administration and the Government of Japan to come up with a negotiated compromise. It was evident by these documents that if things weren't done quickly, the relationship between the two administrations would quickly sour, more so than it appeared in the public eye. On July 12, 1977, a telegram from Ambassador Mansfield begins with the subject line, "The Reprocessing issue and future U.S. - Japan relations." [25]

Appointing Mansfield as Ambassador to Japan was a good move for the Carter Administration as evidenced by this emphatic telegram only a few weeks into his ambassadorship.  It was clear by the tone of the message that the issue was indeed one that threatened the relationship. Mansfield goes on to say that high-level Japanese officials claim that the U.S. does not understand Japan's extraordinary energy predicament nor its commitment to solely peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  Finally, in bullet item 6, he says "the repercussions will be long lasting, severe, and widespread...to procrastinate longer will act to harden each side's position." [26]

Many of the secret documents contained notes and scribbled items from a number of people, but Carter often wrote long notes as shown below from the Mansfield memo.  In a note dated July 12, 1977, Carter says that he will personally expedite the compromise decision.  “Inform Mansfield that I will personally expedite the compromise decision.  He can tell Fukuda. Give me options without delay.” [27]

Just what was at stake over what Prime Minister Fukuda publicly called, “a life and death issue for Japan”?  From a Japanese standpoint, they viewed nuclear energy as indispensable to the future of Japan, vital to the development of Japan's economy as a whole. [28]   The U.S. standpoint tried to balance its nonproliferation concerns and insure that pending non-proliferation legislation would not be impacted by a Tokai decision.  They also hoped to use this to rationalize reprocessing facilities for similar purposes in other countries. [29]   One of the biggest risks was whether or not this type of facility could produce weapons-grade material that could be separated out as plutonium and ultimately be used in a nuclear weapon.

In a memo to the President on August 13, Brzezinski puts the Tokai issue rather simply:

"Tokai is bound to appear as an exception to our general standpoint against reprocessing.  The key issue is thus how an exception can be made with as little damage as possible to our non-proliferation objectives.  None of the technical options is very good from the standpoint of those objectives; the best -- coprocessing -- pushes the Japanese in a direction not regarded as promising on non-proliferation grounds.  Limiting damage to non-proliferation objectives will depend on what political measures accompany any technical solutions." [30]

As pointed out by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a memo dated August 3, 1977, "Whatever nonproliferation advantages would be obtained from coprocessing of blending in terms of national diversion would depend on whether there was a facility capable of separating the plutonium. (In fact, given such a facility, the plutonium may be separated out, possibly in a matter of days without much difficulty.)” [31]   And therein lies the biggest risk of all, being able to produce separated plutonium.  Another issue was of course financial, if modifications were to be made to the Tokai facility because of a policy change, who would pay for the changes?

As the end of August approached, both administrations began to negotiate a compromise agreement that would satisfy both governments and allow the facility to begin operation, at least in part with out much delay.  The conversion of part of Tokai to a coprocessing facility, one that would not be capable of producing pure plutonium would satisfy the U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

But would that be acceptable to the Japanese?  In a series of memos detailing the final negotiations, it appeared that the Japanese were willing to offer to delay construction of a plutonium conversion plant.  The plant was one of the most critical items in the entire Japanese program for the utilization of plutonium in advanced reactors.  Without the conversion plant, the plutonium produced at Tokai could not be used as reactor fuel. [32]

Finally, on August 31, 1977, a secret memo from Brzezinski to the President outlined his and the negotiating teams final recommendations, supported by ACDA to accept an agreement that:

In essence, the Japanese (1) want to defer decision on coprocessing for two years, subject to R & D and INFCEP; (2) recognize that U.S. originated fuel will not be available beyond the two-year period unless they accept coprocessing; and (3) are willing to impose a voluntary deferment on the construction of their proposed plutonium conversion plant, despite their financial commitments to proceed. [33]

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