The Tokai Dialogue

We begin in late January 1977, soon after Vice President Mondale was sent to Japan.  In a secret document from the Department of State, the memorandum of conversations between the Vice President and Prime Minister Fukuda begin the dialogue that would eventually threaten the good relationship.  During Mondale's first day of talks, introductions and pleasantries were exchanged. Topics included economic issues and the GNP as well as laying the groundwork for the two administrations to work closely together. [10]   On the second day however, one of the main issues was that of the security of the Korean peninsula and the withdrawal of ground forces. During Carter's campaign, he had made many references to pulling troops out of South Korea.  The Vice President reassured the Prime Minister that when the President spoke of the withdrawal of ground forces he had always stressed that it would be done in the closest consultation with the governments of both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. [11]

Mondale goes on to say in that second day of discussions, that there were several other points he wished to discuss.  First, with respect to nuclear proliferation, he said the U.S. had pressed both Germany and France to exercise great care with respect to sales of sensitive materials and technologies, that reprocessing facilities that could produce weapons-grade material were “simply bomb factories.” [12]   This was a sensitive topic indeed, and given Japan's history, their decision to develop nuclear energy came with great care.  This combined with their almost total dependence on foreign oil meant that they had no choice but to develop alternate-energy sources and nuclear energy was the most viable choice for their self-sufficient energy policy.

This was the first time in the Carter administration’s dealings with the Japanese that the subject of nuclear reprocessing was brought up, and one would think that the Vice President could have been more sensitive than to call them "bomb factories."  In making reference to the Germans and French, the Vice President was beginning to lay the groundwork for further discussions by making reference to the goals of the nonproliferation treaty.  It was that treaty and other attempts at arms control that have since formed the basis of what has been an attempt, albeit difficult, to control the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

Since the end of World War II, nuclear arms control has revolved around three kinds of negotiations: controls on testing and development of nuclear weapons, such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty; controls on the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that currently do not have them, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty; and ceilings on the numbers of weapons that the two superpowers deploy, such as Salt 1 and Salt II. [13]   Salt 1 was signed on May 26, 1972.  President Carter and Leonid Breznev of the Soviet Union signed Salt II in June 1979.

Prior to the signing of the nonproliferation treaty in 1968, a number of crucial events occurred related to the spread of nuclear technology.  In December of 1953, President Eisenhower announced at the United Nations, the “Atoms for Peace” program, essentially permitting American corporations to sell reactors and fissile materials abroad.  And as part of the plan, in 1957, the United Nations established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to account for the flow of fissile material in and out of reactors, in order to make sure that it was not being diverted to make weapons.  As might have been expected, by the mid-1960’s, most European countries and a surprising number of Third World countries, such as Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Iran and Argentina, were all operating nuclear reactors. [14]

When the nonproliferation treaty was signed in 1968, the U.S, the Soviet Union and Great Britain agreed not to transfer technology that would permit the development of nuclear weapons in other countries.  The other countries signing the treaty agreed not to develop these weapons.  France and China did not sign the agreement; neither DeGaulle nor Mao Tse-Tung wanted to undermine their country’s infant nuclear weapons programs. [15]

An incident that greatly influenced Carter’s stand on nuclear energy occurred early in 1952, when a nuclear reactor at an experimental installation in Chalk River, Canada, suffered a meltdown and some radioactive material escaped into the atmosphere.  The Canadian government made an urgent request to the Atomic Energy Commission for assistance in disassembling the damaged nuclear reactor core.

Carter was a member of the team dispatched to the site. A duplicate mock-up of the reactor was constructed on a nearby tennis court, in which the men were able to practice each tedious step of the dismantling process.  The intensity of the radiation at the core meant that each man could spend only ninety seconds in the reactor. In teams of three they descended far beneath the ground, where their work was monitored by closed-circuit television.  Every time they removed a bolt or fitting, the equivalent piece was removed from the mock-up.  Finally, Carter and his two colleagues descended into the reactor and worked furiously but methodically for their allotted time.  Eventually the reactor was completely disassembled.  The experience made a deep impression on Carter, perhaps more so than he knew at the time. [16]

[Return to top]