The Economies of Nuclear Reprocessing

On March 15, 1977, Cyrus Vance briefed President Carter on his upcoming meeting with Japanese Ambassador Togo. One of the main topics to be discussed was the U.S. nuclear policy.  In particular the Japanese were deeply concerned that emerging U.S. nuclear fuel reprocessing policy, and a possible moratorium on reprocessing, might restrict development of Japan's domestic nuclear energy program. A particularly urgent aspect for Japan was to secure U.S. permission to begin operation of its $200 million Tokai Mura nuclear power facility, now approaching start-up, which depended on U.S. origin fuel. [17]

This memo was the first mention of the Tokai nuclear facility contained in the declassified documents.  The Tokai Mura facility is located in Ibaraki prefecture, northeast of the Tokyo or Kanto region. [18]   The Japanese administration was under great political pressure at home and abroad to not only continue development of an alternative energy source, but to put the over 200 million dollars of investment to work.  They felt it was time to begin "hot testing" and that the U.S. was beginning to contradict itself on its policy with Japan.  There were also comments by the Japanese suggesting that they were being treated differently from the Germans or French, both of who already had facilities similar to the Tokai plant.  In another briefing dated March 20, 1977, Cyrus Vance prepares the President for upcoming discussions with Prime Minister Fukuda. He begins by saying:

Because of the extreme concern Japan feels for the possible shape of new U.S. policy toward nuclear reprocessing, Fukuda sent a special representative, Ryukishi Imai, to hold discussions with U.S. officials. Imai forcefully argued that the objectives of nonproliferation can be achieved by limiting access to reprocessing to the only four states which can justify a full fuel cycle (U.S., USSR, FRG, Japan); that Japan signed the NPT (nonproliferation treaty) to obtain benefits under Article IV for peaceful development, which the U.S. now seems about to deny; and that Japan had developed its nuclear program, including the Tokai facility, following U.S. guidance and stimulus. Imai suggested that a sudden change of mind by the U.S. would cause distrust and suspicion. [19]

The Tokai Mura issue was beginning to pick up steam and President Carter was due to make his first trip abroad as President to attend an economic summit in the United Kingdom.  The Prime Minister of Japan, Takeo Fukuda would be there as would be the heads of state of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy.  Just what was the Carter administration’s policy? It appeared that not everyone in the administration had the same ideas about what it was and were making conflicting policy statements. The Japanese interpreted this as indicating that this issue just wasn't as pressing for the U.S. government as it was for them.

In April 1977, the Carter administration continued to look at how they should approach the issue and assembled a governmental team to explore possible resolutions. In a briefing for the President, Warren Christopher, a member of the Carter team emphasizes that:

The Japanese government faces severe and probably unacceptable embarrassment if the prototype facility cannot be used in some form. The Japanese media and the mass media view this issue as a nationalistic one in which resource-poor Japan is being denied energy self-sufficiency. We have therefore developed an approach which will explore with the GOJ (Government of Japan) the feasibility of operating Tokai on an experimental basis, with a modified process which does not produce separated plutonium. [20]

In May 1977, a telegram to the U.S. Secretary of State details a conversation, where Prime Minister Fukuda told Carter that resolution of the Tokai Mura issue was critical for him. In conversation, Carter told Fukuda that he would tell the Department of State to re-examine the matter and see to it that the issue would not embarrass Fukuda. [21] The telegram goes on to say "Fukuda had been most impressed by Carter's statement on Japan at a press conference announcing a new U.S. nuclear policy on April 7, but then had been disturbed by statements made subsequently by lower level officials which contradicted the President's remarks." [22] It was beginning to cause friction and even mistrust in the less than five-month old Carter Administration.

In a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, dated May 27, 1977, the results of an options paper completed by the State Department were available and were being analyzed by the ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.) Among the series of options, the ACDA preferred Option 3 with a few caveats:

ACDA prefers Option 3 with respect to the use of Tokai, but believes that the U.S. should not offer the possibility of the U.S. providing plutonium for the next Japanese breeder reactor (the "Monju"), nor should the U.S. agree to permit U.S.-origin fuel to be reprocessed for that purpose.  We have calculated that the British-supplied "Magnox" reactor at Tokai can provide sufficient plutonium to meet this Japanese breeder need.  Since we have no say over the disposition of spent fuel from that reactor, the Japanese could send the fuel to the UK for reprocessing. [23]

What did this mean politically for the Carter Administration?  The memo goes on to detail additional reasons why this would be the best option, specifically stating that this option would thereby:

- Avoid the appearance of the U.S. actively supporting foreign plutonium breeder work

- Avoid the transfer of Japanese fuel of U.S. origin for reprocessing

- Circumvent the need to make an advanced commitment on light-water reprocessing at Windscale (which is already functioning for Magnox fuel but not light water fuel)

- Treating the Japanese the same as the Germans, in that both are having fuel reprocessed over which we have no control. [24]

Weren't the Japanese already being treated the same as the Europeans or did the Government of Japan have a real gripe with the Carter Administration?

[Return to top]